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The question
The question this week, from privacy, security, and risk teams with EU operations, is simple: the Council of the EU has backed a longer, narrower breach-notification rule, so should the incident-response playbook change? The short answer is not yet, but the design of the playbook should. This guide explains what binds today, what the Council text would change, and the four low-cost changes worth making this quarter. It is general information and not legal advice.
What binds today
Article 33 of the GDPR, which has applied since 25 May 2018, requires a controller to notify the competent supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware of a personal data breach, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to individuals. Article 34 separately requires telling affected individuals when a breach is likely to result in a high risk. Every timer, escalation path, and template in the playbook should still point at those two articles. Nothing about the proposal changes the rule in force.
What the Council text would change
The Council’s negotiating mandate, agreed on 21 October 2026 and circulated as Council document 14756/26, would rewrite Article 33 so that notification to the supervisory authority is required only for a breach likely to result in a high risk, within 96 hours where feasible, with reasons given for any later notification.
| Element | Today (in force) | Council mandate (proposed) |
|---|---|---|
| Notification trigger | Any breach that is a risk to individuals | Only a breach likely to result in a high risk |
| Deadline to authority | 72 hours where feasible | 96 hours where feasible, reasons for any delay |
| Routing | Direct to the supervisory authority | Via a national entry point under a new NIS2 Article 23b, once it exists |
| Template and lists | National variation | EDPB-prepared common template; EDPB high-risk and not-high-risk lists |
| Individual notice (Art 34) | Unchanged | Unchanged |
What to build now
Four changes are worth making this quarter, because they cost little and pay off whatever the final text says. The common thread is to turn the rule into parameters, so a change in the law becomes a configuration change rather than a project.
- Make the threshold a parameter. Record the risk assessment for every breach as a structured field: likelihood, severity, categories of data, number of individuals, and whether the outcome is no risk, risk, or high risk. Today the risk outcome triggers notification; under the proposal only high risk would. A structured record lets the rule change by configuration.
- Make the clock a parameter. Store the awareness timestamp and compute the deadline from a configurable window, currently 72 hours, so moving to 96 is a settings change rather than a rewrite.
- Make the destination a parameter. Keep the supervisory authority as the live route, with the national entry point as a future option that can be switched on when it exists.
- Keep the evidence. Article 33 already requires documenting every breach, including ones not notified. If the threshold rises, the documented reasoning for not notifying becomes the record a supervisor will examine.
Where financial services firms should look
The mandate, like the Commission proposal, routes DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) incident reports through the same national entry points as NIS2. Banks, insurers, and investment firms that report major ICT incidents under DORA and personal data breaches under the GDPR often run two intake processes for one event. Map where those processes overlap now, so a single national intake can be adopted quickly if the final text delivers one. Do not merge them before it does, because the two regimes still have distinct triggers, timelines, and content requirements until the law says otherwise.
What usually goes wrong
- Drift, not a decision. Nobody formally adopts 96 hours. Someone reads a headline, a deadline in a ticket template moves, and a breach is notified on day four with a cover note citing a rule not yet in force. A short written confirmation to the incident-response team that the 72-hour rule stands closes this off.
- Treating a higher threshold as a reason to stop assessing. The proposal moves the notification line; it does not remove the duty to assess and document every breach. Low and medium-risk breaches still have to be assessed and recorded, whatever the final threshold.
Where PiTech fits
PiTech Solutions helps regulated organizations design incident and data-governance controls that stay compliant with the rule in force and ready for the one being negotiated: a breach-assessment record with threshold, clock, and destination as parameters; the documentation Article 33 already requires; and the DORA-and-GDPR intake mapping that lets a single national entry point be adopted quickly if the final text delivers one. It connects this to the AI incident response and data governance work behind it. Delivery runs under CMMI Level 3 and ISO 27001, 9001, and 42001 certifications. See Data Solutions, AI, GenAI and ML, and Process Solutions. PiTech Solutions Inc. is headquartered in Durham, North Carolina (UEI GNLRY5LNNVH6, CAGE 530K4) and is distinct from similarly named companies.
The bottom line
The 96-hour, high-risk-only rule is a Council negotiating position, not law, and the 72-hour Article 33 deadline still binds. A playbook built on parameters, threshold, clock, and destination, turns the eventual rule change into a configuration task rather than a rebuild. Make those four changes this quarter, keep the evidence, and confirm the 72-hour rule in writing to your incident team.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs)
Is the GDPR breach notification deadline now 96 hours?
No. The 72-hour deadline under Article 33 of the GDPR, in force since 25 May 2018, still applies. The 96-hour figure comes from the Council of the EU’s negotiating mandate on the Digital Omnibus, agreed on 21 October 2026, which is a proposed position, not law. For the change to take effect, the European Parliament must adopt its own position, the institutions must agree a final text in negotiation, and that text must enter into force and reach its application date. Until all of that happens, controllers must continue to notify the competent supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours of becoming aware of a personal data breach. Treating 96 hours as the current rule would mean relying on a law that does not yet exist.
What is the Digital Omnibus proposal on breach notification?
It is part of the EU’s Digital Omnibus simplification effort. The Council of the EU’s negotiating mandate, agreed 21 October 2026 and circulated as Council document 14756/26, would rewrite GDPR Article 33 so that notification to the supervisory authority is required only for a breach likely to result in a high risk, within 96 hours where feasible, with reasons for any later notification. It would route notifications through a national entry point established under a new Article 23b of the NIS2 Directive once that entry point exists, have the European Data Protection Board prepare a common notification template for the Commission to adopt, and have the EDPB publish lists of circumstances that are and are not likely to result in a high risk. All of this is proposed, and the final content could change in negotiation with the Parliament.
When would the 96-hour rule take effect?
There is no fixed date, and it may never take effect in its current form. The Council mandate is one institution’s negotiating position; the European Parliament has not yet adopted its position, and a final text has to be agreed between the institutions, enter into force, and reach an application date before anything binds. The mandate’s application dates are placeholders counted from an entry into force that has not happened. Because the proposal still has to pass through the Parliament and inter-institutional negotiation, both its timing and its final content are uncertain. Organizations should track the Parliament’s position and the subsequent negotiation rather than planning around a specific date, and should continue operating under the 72-hour rule until a final, applicable text says otherwise.
What should we change in our breach playbook now?
Design, not deadlines. Four low-cost changes pay off whatever the final text says. Make the notification threshold a parameter by recording each breach’s risk assessment as a structured field (likelihood, severity, data categories, number of individuals, and whether the outcome is no risk, risk, or high risk). Make the clock a parameter by storing the awareness timestamp and computing the deadline from a configurable window, currently 72 hours. Make the destination a parameter by keeping the supervisory authority as the live route with the national entry point as a future option. And keep the evidence, since Article 33 already requires documenting every breach including those not notified. These changes let a future rule change become a configuration task rather than a rebuild, without adopting the proposed rule prematurely.
Does the proposal remove the duty to assess low-risk breaches?
No. The proposal would move the notification line so that only breaches likely to result in a high risk require notification to the supervisory authority, but it does not remove the controller’s duty to assess and document every breach. Article 33 already requires documenting all breaches, including those that are not notified, and that documentation is precisely what a supervisor examines. If the threshold rises, the documented reasoning for not notifying a lower-risk breach becomes more important, not less, because it is the record that justifies the decision. Treating a higher notification threshold as permission to stop assessing or recording low and medium-risk breaches would be a mistake, both under the current rule and under the proposal, and would leave the organization unable to defend its notification decisions.
How does this affect DORA incident reporting?
The Council mandate, like the Commission’s proposal, would route DORA incident reports through the same national entry points as NIS2 reporting. Financial entities such as banks, insurers, and investment firms frequently have to report a single event twice: as a major ICT-related incident under DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554) and as a personal data breach under the GDPR, often through separate intake processes. The proposed single national entry point could streamline that. The practical step now is to map where the DORA and GDPR reporting processes overlap, so that a single national intake can be adopted quickly if the final text delivers one, while keeping the two processes distinct until the law changes, because the regimes currently have different triggers, timelines, and content requirements.
Why did the 96-hour figure appear twice?
The 96-hour deadline appears in both the European Commission’s proposal of 19 November 2025 and the Council of the EU’s negotiating mandate of 21 October 2026, which means it has survived one institutional stage. That gives it some durability as a likely landing point, but it is not decisive, because the European Parliament has not yet adopted its position and the figure could still change in inter-institutional negotiation before a final text is agreed. So while the repetition of 96 hours across the Commission and Council texts suggests where the rule may end up, treating it as settled would be premature. The prudent reading is that 96 hours is a strong candidate for the final deadline, not a certainty, and that the 72-hour rule remains the one to comply with until the law actually changes.
What does Article 33 require today?
Article 33 of the GDPR requires a controller, on becoming aware of a personal data breach, to notify the competent supervisory authority without undue delay and, where feasible, within 72 hours, unless the breach is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of individuals. Where notification is made after 72 hours, it must be accompanied by reasons for the delay. The controller must also document every breach, including its facts, effects, and remedial action, regardless of whether it was notified, so that the supervisory authority can verify compliance. Separately, Article 34 requires the controller to communicate the breach to affected individuals when it is likely to result in a high risk to their rights and freedoms. These obligations are in force now and are unchanged by the Digital Omnibus proposal.
What is the most common breach-playbook mistake right now?
Drift rather than a decision. The typical failure is that no one formally adopts the 96-hour rule, but someone reads a headline about it, a deadline in a ticket template quietly moves, and a breach ends up notified on day four with a cover note citing a rule that is not yet in force. That exposes the organization to a finding that it missed the binding 72-hour deadline. The fix is simple and cheap: a short written confirmation to the incident-response team that the 72-hour rule still stands, issued now, prevents the drift. The second common mistake is treating the proposed higher threshold as a reason to stop assessing lower-risk breaches, which both the current rule and the proposal continue to require.
Does PiTech help with breach and incident governance?
Yes. PiTech Solutions helps regulated organizations design incident and data-governance controls that stay compliant with the rule in force and ready for the one being negotiated: a breach-assessment record with the notification threshold, clock, and destination built as parameters; the breach documentation Article 33 already requires; and a mapping of where DORA and GDPR reporting overlap, so a single national entry point can be adopted quickly if the final text delivers one. It connects breach governance to AI incident response and the broader data governance behind it, so one foundation serves both. Delivery runs under CMMI Level 3 and ISO 27001, 9001, and 42001 certifications. PiTech works alongside privacy and legal counsel rather than replacing them, and is positioned as a specialist governance partner for regulated industries at a mid-market price.


